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1.1 BackgroundoftheStudyAs statutory audits are deployed to enforce accountability, it is important tounderstandthebasisofassessmentforauditfees.Therearenumerousstudiesonthepricingofauditservices(SimunicA.1980,e.g.Chan,EzzamelƬGwilliam1993,Chung,Narasimhan2002).Althoughvariousfactorsinfluencethesizeofanauditfee,therearesomecommondeterminantsthatarefoundandproventohavestrongcorrelationtoaudit fees.Generallyusedvariables includecompanysize,riskiness,complexityandwhethertheauditisperformedby‘bigfour’company,andiftheauditishappeninginthebusyperiod.(Pong,Whittington1994,SimunicA.1980,DeAngelo1981b,Brinn,PeelƬRoberts1994)
AccountinglegislationandtheGenerallyAcceptedAccountingPrinciples(GAAP)leavediscretiontomanagersoveraccountingpoliciesandprocedures,thusleavingflexibilitytofinancialreporting.Thisallleadstothecoreofearningsmanagement:Netincomecannot bedeterminedwith one simple formula.This opens the door for earningsmanagement, with motives arising from contractual, market, or management’spersonalincentives.(Graham,HarveyƬRajgopal2005)
Earningsmanagementhasbeentopicofacademicresearchforoverfourdecades(seee.g.Dechow,SloanƬSweeney1995,Healy1985,Jones1991)ǤTraditionally,academicresearchhasfocusedonaccrualsmanipulation,thatis,whenearningsmanagementisdone through discretionary accruals. In addition,more recently there have beenstudies that indicate that managers are more willing to use real operationmanipulationsforearningsmanagementpurposes,ratherthanaccrualsmanipulation(Graham,HarveyƬRajgopal2005).Earningsmanagementistrickysubject,sinceitcandistorttheinformationthatisprovidedinfinancialstatementsandthuspossiblyharmshareholdersorotherstakeholders,eventhoughearningsmanagement isnotillegalper se. Furthermore, the implications earningsmanagementmighthave canspanfurther,asshort-termvalueispreferredoverlong-termperformance. (Gioielli,DeCarvalho2008)Engaging inearningsmanagementoften leads todeviating from
ʹ

optimal operational practices, which in turn can cause harm to the firm (Ewert,Wagenhofer2005).An example of such is  casewhereprojectswithpositivenetpresentvalueare ignored, thus long-termvaluedisregarded inorder togainshort-termearnings(Gunny2005).
Themainpurposeofanauditistoassurethatfinancialstatementsarefairlypresented.And,asearningsmanagementreferstoalteringthereportedearningsfromoperatingactivities,itincreasestheauditrisk.Nevertheless,theeffectofearningsmanagementhasnotbeenresearchedextensivelyfromthepointofviewofaudits.
1.2 ObjectivesandContributionThemainobjectiveofthisstudyistoexaminewhetherandhowearningsmanagementaffectsauditfees. willconcentrateonanalyzingtheeffectofearningsmanagementonauditfeesinthemanufacturingindustryfromdatacollectedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica. willexaminetheeffectsofthe lessstudied fieldofearningsmanagementdone through real operations manipulation, instead of the widely used accrualsmodels.Earningsmanagement willexaminebyreviewingbothsalesmanipulationandoverproduction.Extantacademicliteratureislimitedonthisfieldingeneral,andevenlesssoontheeffectsoftherealearningsmanagementonauditfees.
Theempiricalpartofthestudyisimplementedthroughquantitativeanalysisusingthe ordinary least squares regression (OLS) model. First, the levels of earningsmanagement are determined using parameter estimates following Roychowdhury(2006),andimplementingmodeldevelopedbyDechowetal.(1998).Thus,focusonthemanipulationofrealactivities:salesmanipulationandoverproduction.Thefinalsampleincludes9541firm-yearobservationsfromtheUSduringtheperiodof2008and 2014. The included observations are from companies that operate in themanufacturing industry, identifiedwith twodigit SIC codes of20 through39.Thisstudycontributestotheacademicliteratureofbothearningsmanagementandauditfeethroughtheresults,bysupportingthepriorfindingsinlargeparts.
͵
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2.1 AuditPricingTheoryTheroleoftheauditoristoassurethatfinancialreportinggivesfairandtrueviewofthefirm’sfinancialperformance.Moreover,theprocessofauditingwilllowertheriskthat thecompany’s financialstatementshavematerialmisstatementsormisleadinginformation.Auditinghasbeenfoundtobethemostcost-efficientwaytoperformsuchcontrolsandassuranceactivities.(Eilifsenetal.2010).Thispartlyexplainsthedemandforanexternalaudit,butitisnottheonlyreason.Auditservicesarerequestedalsowhen  statutory audit isnot obligatory. In fact, audit services canbe regarded asmonitoringdevicesrespondingtopotentialconflictsofinterestbetweenownersandmanagers(Watts,Zimmerman1983).Theprincipal-agentproblemariseswhenfirmowners do not have all the information themanagers have, leaving owners withdifficultiesevaluatingtheappropriatenessofthemanagement’sdecisions.








Whereisthecostofauditresourcesperunit,qisthequantityofresourcesusedtoperformtheaudit,E(d)istheexpectedlossfromlitigationcostsandotherlossesdueto the audited financial statements, and E(l) is the probability that the losses arerealizedtotheauditor.(Kallunki,SahlströmƬZerni2007,SimunicA.1980)
Therearefewconditionsonthismodel:(1)boththeauditorandtheauditeeareriskneutralandaretomaximizetheirearningseveryfinancialyear;(2)resourcesareusedefficientlybothinternallyandexternallyfromtheauditcontrolpointofview;(3)theauditeeandtheauditorarebothtogetherandindividuallyresponsibleforthepossiblematerial misstatements if resulting harm to the users of the financial statementinformation(SimunicA.1980).Moreover,theauditorhastosetthefeeonlevelthatwillenableenoughresourcestobeused;inadequateresourcesorauditworkhourscanneverbejustifiedbytheauditfee(Ittonen,Peni2012).Theexternalaudit ispartof firm’s financialreporting.Thus,auditservicescanberegardedasaneconomiccommodity,andthereforeithasitssubstitutes(e.g.internalcontrols).Forprofitcompaniesaimatminimizingthetotalcostoftheaudit(Simunic
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Theauditorreport,aspresentedbythePublicCompanyAccountingOversightBoard(PCAOBUS 2015), states that audits are planned and performed according to thestandardsof thePublicCompanyAccountingOversightBoard toobtain reasonableassuranceaboutwhetherfinancialstatementsarefreeofmaterialmisstatement.Thishighlightsthatthereportisonlyanopiniononwhethertheinformationpresentedonthe financialreports iscorrectand free frommaterialmisstatements.Bydefinition,auditriskreferstoaninstancewhereanauditorissuesanunqualifiedreportdespitematerialmisstatementinfinancialreports(Niemi2003b).Thus,reasonableassuranceexpressestheriskthatmaterialmisstatementisleftundetectedeventhoughtheauditisperformedaccordingtothestandards(Eilifsenetal.2010).




auditee size and complexity, the auditee industry, and some balance sheet items,namelytotalassets, foreignassets,receivablesand inventoriesattheyearend.Sizereferstototalassets,revenuesandotherfinancialmeasuresthatindicatetheextentofbusinessoperations.Complexity ismeasuredby thenumberof subsidiaries,by thenumberofoperational industries,andby theamountof foreignassets. (SimunicA.1980)
Auditriskcanbecompensatedbymodifyingandaddingmorepowerfulaudit tests(Thornton,Moore1993).Whentheauditorperceiveshigherthannormalriskintheplanningphase,auditprogramsare increasedaccordinglytodecreasetherisk levelbacktoacceptable.Theextraworkwillnaturallyincreasetheauditfee.Moreover,riskyclientstendtohavehigherprobabilitytocausenegativepublicityandotherliabilitiestotheauditor.Theserisksaretranslatedintotheauditpricingthroughhigherfee(Hay,KnechelƬWong2006).Thatsaid,empiricalproofofriskpremiumsforauditfeesareinconclusiveanddifficulttoobserve(Niemi2000a,Niemi2002).
2.3 AuditQualityandAuditorSize
DeAngelo(1981b)developedtwo-dimensionaldefinitionofauditquality:first,thematerial misstatement must be detected, after which it must be reported. Thisdefinition hasbecome the standard for addressing the issue since audit quality isunobservable.Thusresearchersusesurrogatesorotherindicatorsofauditqualitytodetermine it. Some researchers use objectiveoutputs, such as litigation rate, peerreview ratings and the frequency of reissuing audit opinions, to determine auditquality.(Wooten2003)





bigauditfirmwith largeclientbase,theimportanceofanysingleclientislowerthantosmallerfirm,thusincreasingtheindependenceduetolowerincentivestonotreportbreach.biggerauditfirmalsohasstrongerincentivetomaintainhighqualityintheiraudits,astheyhavemoretoloseifthequalityisloweredandtheygiveflawedopinion.Allinall,smallerauditfirmhasmoreincentivestogiveflawedopinion,andthus, the size of the audit firm can be perceived as  surrogate for audit quality.(DeAngelo1981b)




rate, the reliability of internal controls, and so on (Ball, Jayaraman Ƭ Shivakumar2012).Infact,instudyofsmallFinnishcompanies,Niemi(2003a)findsthatthesizeoftheauditorandauditfeearepositivelycorrelated,andmoreover,alsocompetencelevel,workexperienceandwhethertheauditoriscertified,affectthefee.Nevertheless,DeAngelo(1981b)assumesthatthereisnodifferenceintheabilitiesbetweenauditors,that is,theyare technicallyequallyqualified toperform qualityaudit.Thequalitydifferencesarise from two things: credibilityand independence.And theseare thefactors valued by the consumers of the financial statement information, as theyperceive the audit better quality if it is performed by an independent auditor.(DeAngelo1981b)Thebigauditfirmshavehigherdegreeofindependence,butalso,theirsizeprovidesanotheradvantagecomparedwiththesmallerfirms.Largeauditeesareoftenmorecomplexthanthesmallerones,operatinginmorethanoneindustry.Thus, the bigger auditors are more likely to know and understand the differentindustriesthanthesmallerones.Fortheseandsimilarreasons,bigauditeeschooseoneofthebigfourcompaniesastheirauditor,asauditorspecializedintheindustrydecreasesthepossibilityofflawedopinion.(Carcello,Nagy2004)













theauditfee(Hay,KnechelƬWong2006),whichisnaturalsincesizecorrelateswiththe amountwork required to perform the audit (Nikkinen, Sahlström 2004, Hay,KnechelƬWong2006).Althoughtheauditeesizeisvastlyacceptedintheacademicliteratureasthepredominantdeterminant,somecriticismhasfallenuponwhethertheauditfeeandsizearelinearlyrelated(Carsonetal.2004).Thereareseveralstudiesonthepremiumspaidtobigauditors,segmentingtheauditeesbysizeorownership(seee.g.Banker,ChangƬCunningham2003,Francis,Simon1987,Lee1996).Furthermore,therearevaryingresultsalsowhethereconomiesofscalewithbigauditeesaffecttheauditfee(seee.g.SimunicA.1980,Pong,Whittington1994).
2.4.2 ComplexityThecomplexityoftheauditeeaffectshowmanyaudithoursarerequiredandthus,isreflectedintheauditfee(Hay,KnechelƬWong2006).Thecomplexityoftheauditeeismoreambiguouslydefinedcomparedtothesizemeasure.Differentstudieshaveuseddifferentmeasures, but some of themore often used ones are (i) the number of(foreign) subsidiaries, (ii) thevalueof foreignassets scaledby totalassets, (iii) thenumberofoperatingindustriesbySICcodes,and(iv)theamountofdifficulttoauditbalances,suchasreceivables(seee.g.Chan,EzzamelƬGwilliam1993,Francis1984,Hay,KnechelƬWong2006,SimunicA.1980).








Studies performed after the Sarbannes-Oxley Act (SOX) find internal controlweaknesses topositively correlatewith the audit fee, either throughhigherbillingratesorhours(JohnstoneandBedard,2008,ascitedbyHoitashetal.2008;Hoitashetal.2008).HoganandWilkins(2008)findthattheseverityofsignificantdeficienciesormaterialweaknessesintheauditee’sinternalcontrolshasanincreasingeffectonauditfees. Studiesfromthepre-SOXperiodhavevaryingresults(Mock,Wright1999),orfindnocorrelationbetweenauditfeeandinternalcontrolrisks(Mock,Wright1993,O'Keefe,SimunicƬStein1994).Thesedifferingresultsrelatetothetwodimensionsofthestudies:whether(i)internalandexternalauditsareeachother’ssubstitutes(FelixJr,Gramling2001),or(ii)theyarecomplementary(Carey,SimnettƬTanewski2000).Although,Sarkatetal.(2009)notethatthesetworolesarenotmutuallyexclusive:instrongergovernanceframework,theinternalauditmaysubstitutesomeexternalauditwork.Moreover,theStatementsofAuditingStandards,number65,allowsanexternalauditor toevaluatewhether the internal auditor’swork canbeused to reduce theproceduresto(i)obtainunderstandingofinternalcontrols,(ii)assessrisk,or(iii)toreduce the substantive procedures of the financial statement audit (AICPA 2015).Niemi (2000a) confirms thiswith his finding of internal control level correlatinginverselywiththeauditfee.
2.4.4 RiskIn theacademic literature therearedifferenceshow researchers conceptualize theterm ‘risk’.Besidesthepreviouslydiscussedauditrisk, incompetitivemarket,the
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auditfeeshouldalsoreflecttheauditorbusinessrisk.Thebusinessriskiscomposedof, for example, lawsuits, sanctions or professional reputational or client losses(Brumfield,ElliottƬJacobson1983).Belletal.(2001)arguethattheauditorbusinessriskisshiftedfromfirmstoclientsintheauditprice.Jubbetal.(1996)notethatauditorbusinessriskhasneverhaddirectmeasureintheauditfeestudies,butinstead,theauditeebusinessriskisusedasproxyforit.Moreover,clientspecificauditriskarisesfromtheauditeebusinessrisk;Simunic(1980)usesmeasuresforrisksuchaslossinlast threeyears,net incomescaledby totalassetsand theauditopinion. Jubbetal.(1996)statethatthere is lotofconfusion inthedefinitionofrisk intheempiricalliterature,andproposethattheauditriskandbusinessriskareseparatedimensionsofriskandshouldbebothincludedintheauditfeemodels.
Francis(1984)findssignificantrelationshipbetweenauditeeriskinessandtheauditfee. It canbebecause auditorsneed toperformmorepowerful tests toobtain therequireddegreeofassurancewhentheauditeeriskincreases(Kinney1975),andthusriskier clients requiremore audit time (Thornton,Moore 1993). Interestingly, incontrasttothetheory,Belletal.(2001)recovered littletonoevidence fromtheirinterviewswithauditorsthattheexpectedcostofbusinessriskisshiftedtoclients.
2.4.5 ProfitabilityandDebtRatioAuditee profitability can be regarded as  form of riskmeasure, as it reflects theauditor’s probability of losswhen the auditee is in financial distress. One of themeasuresforfinancialdistressisthedebtratio,andasinthecaseofauditeedefault,thecostincurredisbornebytheauditor,thusthepossiblecostistranslatedintotheauditfee.(SimunicA.1980)Hay(2006)findspositivecorrelationbetweenthedebtratioandauditfee,whichissupportedbythefindingsofSimunicandStein(1996),ashighdebtratioincreasesdefaultrisk.Ashigherdebtratioisexpectedtoincreasetheauditfee,anincreaseinprofitabilityisexpectedtolowertheauditfee,asthebusinessriskislowerfortheauditor(Hay,KnechelƬWong2006).
Assomestudies findpositivecorrelationbetweenthedebtratioandtheaudit fee(e.g.Hay,Knecheletal.2006;Griffin,Lontetal.2010),other studieshavevarying
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results.Hay(2006)suspectsthatauditorsarenotassensitivetoauditeeprofitabilitydifferencesas theaudit feemodels suggest. In different approach,Dhaliwaletal.(2008)speculatewhethertheauditfeeissignofhighqualityauditandthussignof lowdefault risk andhighly reliable financial statements. Inwhich case itwoulddecreasethecostofdebtandthusallowhigherdebtratio;orwhetherhighauditfeedecreasestheauditorindependence,andthuslowersthefinancialstatementreliabilityforwhich thecostofdebt increases (Dhaliwaletal.2008).Bothapproacheswouldsomewhatcontrasttheideabehindthepreviouslydiscussedfinancialriskapproach,eventhough,theendresultisthesame.Hayetal.(2006)concludethatrecentstudiesshowthatprofitability,andespeciallyloss,isevermoreimportantdriverforauditfees.
2.4.6 IndustryThe differences between different industries have great effects on the financialstatement audit. Some industries aremore difficult to audit than others, and forexampleSimunic(1980)findssomeevidencethatthesedifferencesaretranslatedintotheauditfee.Palmrose(1986)speculatesthatitisduetothedifferencesinauditrisk and or audit requirements. Gonthier-Besacier et al. (2007) find significantcorrelationbetweentheinformationtechnologyindustryandtheauditfee,whereas,financial institutions and utility companies have lower audit fees (Hay,Knechel ƬWong2006).




receivablesorintangibleassets.IntheFinnishmarket,itcouldbearguedthatfinancialinstitutions have relatively lower audit fees for two reasons: higher operatingefficiency through auditor industry specialization (as suggested by Gävert 2014)combinedwiththeeasier-to-auditbalancesheets.
As opposed to financial institutions, companies in themanufacturing industry areexpectedtohaverelativelyhigheraudit feesthanother industries. It is fortheveryreasonthattheyhavelargerbalancesofcurrentassetsandmoreriskyreceivablesthatareconsequentlymorelaborioustoaudit(Hay,KnechelƬWong2006).Thebalancesthatrequirespecialauditprogramshavebeenfoundtocorrelatewithhigherauditfees(SimunicA.1980).
2.5 OtherDeterminantsInadditiontothepreviouslydiscussedfactorsaffectingauditfees,therearestudiesontheeffectoflowballing,thatis,theinitialauditengagementisdiscounted,inordertowinthebidontheclient,andlaterrecuperatetheloss(DeFond,Zhang2014,Ettredge,Greenberg 1990,DeAngelo 1981a).Niemi (2000a) notes that also that productionfactorsaffect,andthedifferentdivisionoftheauditworkhourstopartner,managerandotherauditorswillaffectthetotalauditfee.IttonenandPeni(2012)findthatthesexoftheauditoraffectstheaudit fees,as femaleauditorschargehigher fees.Theysuspectthatitisduetodifferencesintheadventurismbetweenmenandwomen,thusaddingeithertherequiredworkor increasing theriskpremium.Somestudieshaveincludedanownershipvariabletotheirmodel,andwhethertheauditeeispubliclyorprivatelyowned(seee.g.Hay,KnechelƬWong2006,Niemi2005).




Inthischapterthereaderisfamiliarizedwithtothetopicofearningsmanagement.willconcentrateonfivedifferentthemes,allimportantfromtheearningsmanagementpointofview.willstartwithdefinitions,afterwhichwillexplaintheconnectiontoaccounting theory. After covering the management incentives,  will discuss thedifferenttypesandmeansofearningsmanagement.Lastly,willpresentthedifferentresearchmethodsusedinearningsmanagementstudies.























normal activities resulting in earnings. Moreover, neither does it take intoconsideration the fact thatnot all earningsmanagement ismisleading,but aimsatincreasing informativeness (Healy,Wahlen1999).Ronen andYaari (2008) classifyearningsmanagement into threedifferent typesaccording to thepurpose.Earningsmanagement can be (1) beneficial,when signaling long-term value, that is takingadvantageofthediscretionaryaccountingtreatmentstosignalprivateinformationonfuturecashflows(Fudenberg,Tirole1995).Itcanbe(2)malevolent:whenconcealingreducing transparency of either short- or long-term value (Healy,Wahlen 1999,Schipper 1989). Or (3) neutral: when revealing the short-term true performance(Healy,Wahlen1999).Theyofferanalternativedefinitionof(MullerIII1999)earningsmanagement:
”Earningsmanagementiscollectionofmanagerialdecisionsthat
resultinnotreportingthetrueshort-term,value-maximizingearnings
asknowntomanagement.“(Ronen,Yaari(2008)p.27)As thegeneraldefinitionsarestillambiguous, inorder toclarifywhat is,orcanbeconsideredasearningsmanagement,willpresentsomeexamplesofthemethodsusedtomanageearnings,asnotedbyAyres(1994),BrunsandMerchant(1990),Francis(2001)andothers.(i)MethodsrelatingtotheGAAP,suchasthechoiceofacceptedtreatments,timingofadoptingnewstandards,estimateandvaluationdecisions.(ii)Methodsrelatingtotheclassificationofitemsinordertoaffecttheoperatingincome.(iii)Timingofrevenue(expense)recognition(Bartov1993,Gunny2005)anddecisionstoovercapitalizeexpenses(MullerIII1999),and(iv)realproductionandinvestmentdecisions. And lastly, (v) methods relating to the presentation of the financialstatements, such as presenting Pro Forma earnings or reporting comprehensiveincome on the equity statement (Lee,Petroni Ƭ Shen2006). As suggestedby theliterature, inthisstudy considerearningsmanagementasmanipulationwithinthediscretionoftheapplicationoftheGAAP.




3.1.1 Accrual-basedEarningsManagementAccruals are the difference between reported earnings and the cash flow fromoperations.Accrualscanbefurtherdividedintotwocomponents:non-discretionaryaccruals,anddiscretionaryaccruals(Cohen,DeyƬLys2008),meaningtheaccrualsthatareuptothediscretionofthemanagement.Tofurtherclarify,themanagementhas setofprocedures thataregenerallyaccepted in theaccounting legislation, toworkwithwhilechoosingthediscretionaryaccruals(Healy1985).
Manipulation practices In the literature,several techniquesare identifiedasaimstoearningsmanagementthrough discretionary accruals. One set of techniques arises from the US GAAPregulationdemandingreserves forthe futureobligations.ThesesocalledCookie Jar
Reserve techniques can be created in periods of strong financial performance byoverstatingreserves,expenses,andȀorbymakingone-timewrite-offs(Levitt1998).Andoncecreated, inperiodsofweakfinancialperformance,thereversalofaccrualsand reserves can reduce expenses and thus increase earnings (Kokoszka 2003).(ElMoatasemAbdelghany2005)Although,theobligationsneedtobemeasurableandof high certainty to qualify for the reserve entries, the estimation of the futureobligationcreatestheopportunityforearningsmanagement.Suchsituationsare forexample,estimatingsalesreturns,baddebtwrite-offs,andwarrantycosts.
Anothersetoftechniques,thesocalled ‘BigBath̵techniquesarise fromaccountingstandards that allowmanagement to do substantially restructure the business oreliminateoperationsinordertoremaincompetitive.Theincentiveformanagersisto“use” all expenses in one bad year instead and reporting only one year of poorperformance,insteadofseveralyears.Thesekindsoftechniquesareoftenexploitedwhen restructuring activities and changes in themanagement team arehappeningsimultaneously. (Elliott, Shaw 1988, Levitt1998)Again, it is the estimation of theexpensesthatoffertheopportunitytodeployearningsmanagementpractices.Suchestimations are needed in asset impairment andwrite-downs, and in disposal of
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operations. By exploiting these techniques, by overstating the expenses currentearnings will decrease, and by reversing excessive reserves future earnings willincrease.(ElMoatasemAbdelghany2005)
Thenextsetoftechniquesentailsthedifferentpracticesusedonassets.AstheUSGAAPrequirespassiveinvestmentstobecategorizedaseither‘trading’or‘availableforsale’,itenablesthemanagement,bychangingtheholdingintent,toreportunrealizedgainsorlosses,ortowrite-downimpairedsecuritiesinordertodecreaseearnings(Hunton,LibbyƬMazza2006,Maines,McDaniel2000).Moreover,assetsprovidinglong-termbenefitsareamortized,depreciatedanddepletedoftenbasedonestimatesoffactorssuch as the useful lifetime. The treatment of these kinds of assets offers severalopportunitiestomanageearnings:throughselectingthewrite-offmethodandperiod,by the estimationof salvage value,orby changing their status tonon-operational.(Elliott,Hanna1996)
Levitt (1998) notes twomore techniques. First, in improper revenue recognitionrevenuesarerecognizedbefore theyareactuallyearned.Furthermore,Levittnotesthat in the SEC’s enforcement case filed in 1999 and 2000, overhalf of them hadrevenue recognition issues. In the other technique management is abusing thematerialityconcept,thatis,managementignoresmistakesandrecordingerrorsinthefinancialstatementsdeliberately,assumingthattheyareinsignificant.






Manipulation practices Extantacademicliteraturepresentsrelativelyunifiedviewofthemethodsclassifiedas real earningsmanagement: (1) Increasing sales by offering price discounts orthroughmorelenientcreditterms;(2)Overproductiontoreportlowercostofgoods;and (3)decreasingdiscretionaryexpenses, such asR&D. (Cohen,Dey Ƭ Lys2008,Dechow,KothariƬWatts1998,Gunny2005,Roychowdhury2004,2006,Xu,TaylorƬDugan2007)
The manipulation methods can be also categorized based on activity type:manipulation of operating and investing activities andmanipulation of financingactivities.Thethreepresentedmethodsallfallunderthecategoryofoperationalandinvestmentactivitymanipulations.Underthesamecategorygoestheclassificationofinvestment transaction, aiming at two things: taking advantage of the treatmentassociated with the transaction such as business acquisitions, leases or equityinvestments; and the application of managerial judgement related to thosetransactions(Xu,TaylorƬDugan2007).Similarly,instructuringfinancingactivities,managersareabletoadvantageofthealternativeaccountingchoices.Although,thatfalls under the category of manipulation of financing activities. So does therepurchasingofoutstandingstockstoincreasethefutureearningspershare(EPS),ortomitigate thedilution of theEPS.Furthermore, investing activitiesmanipulationsincludesuchactivitiesasgrantingstockoptions to increaseearnings,oremployingfinancialinstruments,suchasfinancialderivatives.(Xu,TaylorƬDugan2007)
3.1.3 EarningsManagementthroughAccountingStandardsdecisionsThe FinancialAccounting StandardsBoard (FASB)has issued on average fivenewstandardsperyearsinceitsformationin1973.Thenormaltransitionperiodistwotothreeyearspriortothemandatoryadoption.Duetotheadoptionwindow,managershavetheopportunitytochoosethetimingoftheadoptionthatisthemostfavorable.(Ayres1994).Also,switchingfromoneGAAPmethodtodifferentonecanbeusedas
 method for earnings management, although the change cannot be made veryfrequently. Furthermore, conservative accounting, that is practicing accountingmethods that keep carrying values of assets low, can be regarded as earnings
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management,as the reported earningsare often lower thanwhatwouldbeunderneutral/moreliberalaccountingchoices.(Penman,Zhang2002)
3.2 EarningsQualityandEarningsManagementEarnings quality refers to the amount of information earnings provide about thefinancialperformance.Theprimaryfocusoffinancialreportingshouldbeinformationaboutearnings,according toSFACNo.1,and itshouldrepresent the firm’s financialperformanceduringthereportingperiod(FASB2008).
Thekeytounderstandingtheconceptofearningsquality,istorealisethatquality,aswellastheinformationitself,isconditionaltospecificdecisionmadebyspecificdecision-maker. The decision-makers include auditors, capitalmarket participants,compensationcommitteesandanalysts,allofwhichhavetheirownconsequencesofearningsquality.(Dechow,GeƬSchrand2010)Thus,thereisnounambiguouswaytodefineormeasureearningsquality.





Incentives Earningsmanagementincentivescanbecategorizedintwogroups,basedontheobjectit relates to. The first group consists of management related objectives. First,dependingonthecontracts,managementcanhaveincentivestomanipulateearningsto increase their compensation.Or, in CEO turnover situation, in the last yearofgoverningtheleavingCEOcantrytoincreaseone’sownbonusand/orchancetoobtainthedirectorship,ortheincomingCEOcanmanipulateearningsdownwardsinordertoease futureearnings growthand to reset thepreviousCEO’searnings growth rate.(Wells2002) moreborderline case for earningsmanagement is insider trading,wherethemanagementmightexploittheirprivateinformationtomakeprofits.Lastly,incaseofmanagementbuyout,managementmightattempttomanipulateearningsinorder to reduce the shareprice tobepaid. (Bergstresser,Philippon2006,Perry,Williams1994)




An alternative categorization often used in earnings management is dividing theincentivesintocontractualandstockmarketincentives.Theassumptionhereisthatmanagersaretoactuponwhatisthebestforthecompany.Although,recentlysomestudieshaveacknowledgedthatthemanagers’personalincentivescanalsoaffectthedecision-makingprocess (Graham,Harvey ƬRajgopal2005,Roychowdhury2006).Thusthemanagercanbelookingafterone’sowninterest,insteadofmaximizingthefirm’swelfare.
ConstraintsAcademic literaturehas identified several constraints or limits formanagement tomanage earnings. Most of the constraints of earnings management activities aremarketbased.Although,internalinitiativessuchascorporategovernancecanhavesignificanteffectonthelevelofearningsmanagementactivities.ThisissupportedbyDechow,SloanandSweeney(1996),whofindinternalgovernancestructuretoaffectthelevelofearningsmanagement.Also,thePublicOversightBoard“urgestheboardofdirectorstoplayanactiveroleinthefinancialreportingprocess”(1995p.3).Moreover,theSECcallsforbettergovernancepracticestoconstrainearningsmanagement,andstudies suggest that the best practices are indeed associated with less earningsmanagement(Bedard,ChtourouƬCourteau2004).
Besides corporate governance, the business environment can have  constrainingeffect on managers when it comes to earningsmanagement. Political forces caninfluence itdirectly throughaccountingor tax laws,or through the lawsprotectingshareholders (Ball,Kothari ƬRobin2000), or alternatively, indirectly through theimpactsofmarketforces,suchasshareholdersorcreditors(Portaetal.1996).TheSOXisanexampleofdirect influence,bringing reforms thatcombatbothcorporateandaccountingfraudamongothers(U.S.SecuritiesandExchangeCommission2002).
Whereaccountingstandards leavediscretion forthemanagertoengage inearningsmanagement,thestandardscancreateconstrainstoit.Sweeney(1994)findsthattheprevious accounting choices can limit the discretionary choices to be made, andJiambalvo (1996) discusses the constraining effect of the costs to follow for thecompany if earnings management would be revealed. In general, the different
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accounting standards provided  different level of flexibility. Several studies havecompared the InternationalAccountingStandards (IAS)and InternationalFinancialReportingStandards(IFRS)withtheUSGAAP.Goncharov(2006)explainsthewiderflexibilityinIAS/IFRSbythefactthattheyareadoptedinseveralcountries,andthus,need to bemore flexible to also converge to the national GAAPs. Therefore, it issuspectedthatcountriesorcompaniesreportingunderIAS/IFRSengagemorelikelytoearningsmanagement(Goncharov,Zimmermann2006).
3.4 MethodstoDetectEarningsManagementWithoutknowingthemanagement’strueintentions,itisdifficulttoidentifyearningsmanagementwithcertainty.Thatiscriticismtotheearningsmanagementliterature,where any earningsmanagement identified could aswell be  result of missingvariable or other behavior that is bymistake identified as earningsmanagement.(Gunny2005)




TheHealymodel.Healy (1985)assumes that the systematicearningsmanagementoccursalways.Earningsmanagement isdetectedbycomparingmean totalaccruals(TA),scaledbylaggedtotalassets(A).Themeantotalaccrualsfromtheperiodisusedasmeasureofnon-discretionaryaccruals(NDA).Theunderlyingassumptionisthatiftotalaccrualsisnotzero,itissignofearningsmanagement.
 DA୧୲ = ୘୅౟౪୅౟౪షభ      (1)TheDeAngelomodel.DeAngelo (1986)assumes that for  stationarycompany, thenon-discretionaryaccrualsinperiod tareequaltothenon-discretionaryaccruals intheperiodt-1ǤThus,thediscretionaryaccrual,theearningsmanagementcomponentis
ܦܣ௜௧ = ቀ்஺೔೟ି்஺೔೟షభ ቁ஺೔೟       (2)The Jonesmodel. Jones (1991)proposed that thevariations in revenueswill causevariations on operating capital, and thus also changes in accruals. Also, thedepreciation in the fixed asset decreases the accruals. Therefore, variance in therevenue (ᇞREV) and fixed assets (PPT) are used as independent variables whenpredictingdiscretionaryaccruals.Theequationtoestimatecoefficientsisasfollows:





accruals are the same the across the industry. Thus, first the industry coefficientestimatesarecalculatedasintheJonesmodelandthenfollowedasintheJonesmodel.




motiveforrealearningsmanagementsuggestedbyCohenandZarowin(2010)istomislead (certain) stakeholders that thenormal course of operationshas led to thereportedearnings.AsdiscussedpreviouslyinChapter3.1.2,realearningsmanagementismostoftenstudiedlookingforthreedifferentkindsofactivities:increasingsalesbyprice discounts, lowering the cost of goods sold by overproduction, and paringdiscretionaryexpenses,suchasR&Dorselling,generalandadministrativeexpenses(SG&A). In the fieldofdiscretionaryexpenses,maybe themost studied is theR&Dexpenditures.Thefindingssuggestthatthereis linkbetweenreducedexpenditureand firmsmeeting or beating earnings benchmarks (Cohen, Zarowin 2010); R&Dexpenditures are reduced to increase short-term earnings by the soon-to-exitexecutives(Dechow,Sloan1991).similar link is foundtoassetsales, forexample,Bartov’s (1993) findingssuggest thatassetsalesareused toevenoutbadearningsnews.
Sales manipulation, mainly aiming at increased sales levels, can be obtained bytemporarilyofferingpricediscountsand/ormorelenientcreditterms.Theobjectiveistogeneratesalestothecurrentperiod,insteadofthefollowingone.Withpositivesalesmarginsthecurrentperiodearningswillincrease.Ifpricediscountsareused,marginalprofitsareexpectedtodeclineduetoabnormallyhighproductioncostsinrelationtothesales level,andmoreover,theCFOtobeabnormallylowinrelationtosales.Iftemporaryincreaseinsalesisobtainedthroughmorelenientterms,thedelayedinflow
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of cash might lead to lower CFO in relation to sales in the current period.(Roychowdhury2006)
The third real earnings managementmethod discussed in Chapter 3.1.2was theoverproductiontolowerthereportedcostofgoodssold(COGS),andthusincreasingearnings.Thelogicbehindoverproductionisthatwhenthefixedoverheadcostsaredividedtogreaternumberofunits,thecostperunitwilldecline.However,thecashflows are generallyalsodecreased, through additionalholding costs,or if the overproductionissoldatdiscount,throughlowerprofitmargins,leadingtoabnormallylow CFO. The overproduction canbe detected from abnormally low COGS for theperiod,orabnormallyhighannualproductioncost togivensales levels. Inorder toaccountfortheadditionalinventoriestheproductioncostcanbealsodefinedassumofCOGSandthechangeininventory.(Roychowdhury2006)




=  ߚଵ ଵ஺௦௦௘௧௦౟౪షభ + ߚଶ  ௌ஺௅ாௌ೔೟஺௦௦௘௧௦೔೟షభ + ߚଷ οௌ஺௅ாௌ೔೟஺௦௦௘௧௦೔೟షభ + ߝ௜௧  (6)Thenormallevelofproductioncostisestimatedaslinearfunctionofsales:
୔ୖ୓ୈ౟౪






=  ߚଵ ଵ஺௦௦௘௧௦౟౪షభ + ߚଶ  ௌ஺௅ாௌ೔೟஺௦௦௘௧௦೔೟షభ + ߚଷ οௌ஺௅ாௌ೔೟஺௦௦௘௧௦೔೟షభ + ߝ௜௧  (8)





4.1 PriorFindingsTheauditfeedeterminantsandearningsmanagementareseparatelywildlystudiedintheacademicliterature.willpresentheretherelevantresultsandfindinginthefields,first forthecommonexplanatoryaudit feevariables,andafterwardsthe findingsofeffectsofearningsmanagementonauditfee.
4.1.1 ThecommonexplanatoryauditfeedeterminantsIn the prior studies common explanatory factors have been the auditee size,complexity, and risk, and they have found to have high explanatory power in themodels,andasthestudieshavespannedacrossdifferentsamples,countriesandtimeperiods,theresultscanberegardedrobust(DeFond,FrancisƬWong2000).Thus,willnotfurtherdiscussthefindingsoftheauditeesize,complexityandinternalcontrolas those are uniform in the academic research and themain findings are alreadypresentedinChapter2.4.Also,inChapter2.5therepresentedthe‘lowballing’andtheeffectofchangesintheaccountingstandardsandthenationaldifferencesinaccountingstandards,but these factors arenot further reviewedhere,as theyarebeyond thescopeofthisstudy.
Theresultsofthebusyseasonarevaried.Moststudiesfindpositivecorrelationwithbusy season and the audit fee (Chan, Ezzamel Ƭ Gwilliam 1993, Chaney, Jeter ƬShivakumar2004,Brinn,PeelƬRoberts1994,O'Sullivan1999,Peel,Roberts2003),butonly somewith statisticalsignificance (Ireland,Lennox2002).Theevidenceofpricepremiumspaid forBig four(orpreviouslybig five,six,oreight) isalsomixed,several studies finding an association of higher fees being paid for the big auditcompanies(Basioudis,Francis2007,Ireland,Lennox2002,Chan,EzzamelƬGwilliam1993,Francis,Simon1987,Peel,Roberts2003,Pong,Whittington1994),but somestudiesfindingevidenceofthecontrary(SimunicA.1980,Chaney,JeterƬShivakumar
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2004,Seetharaman,GulƬLynn2002),andexplainingitforexamplebytheeconomiesof scales obtained by the big four, that is then transferred in to the audit pricing(SimunicA.1980).
Similarly,priorstudieshavefoundmixedresultsregardingtherisk.Therearestudiesfocusing onunderstandingwhether identified risk factors increase auditwork, e.g.substantivetesting,ormodifiedauditplans.MockandWright(1999)concludethatinpractice,auditplansarenotstronglyrisk-adjusted.Similarconclusionsaremadealsoby Bedard (1989) and Mock and Wright (1993) using data from actual auditengagements.Theaccountingscandals(namelyEnronandWorldcom)leadingtofallofArthurAndersen,oneofthebigauditfirms,andthepassageoftheSOXin2002arealsoexpectedtoincreasetheriskawarenessoftheauditors(Hogan,Wilkins2008).AsdiscussedpreviouslyinChapter2.4.4,theauditeeriskisgenerallyexpectedandfoundtocorrelatewiththeauditfee,butthedifficultyisthatriskcanbedefinedinseveralways.Somestudieshaveusedproxiessuchas inventoriesandreceivables,on theirownorcombined,tosignalriskinessandfoundcorrelationbetweenthoseproxiesandtheauditfee(SimunicA.1980,Francis,Simon1987,Francis1984).Alsotheinternalcontroldeficienciesandmaterialweaknessescansignalrisksandthosearefoundtocorrelatepositivelywiththeauditfee(Raghunandan,Rama2006,Hoitash,HoitashƬBedard2008).Although,asGeandMcVay(2005)state,thecausalityisdifficultprove,whethertheincreaseintheauditfeeisduetotheriskpremiumorduetotheincreasedtesting.
Thepriorresearchalsousesthepresenceoflossintheprecedingyearsassignofrisk.Therearemanystudiesfindingcorrelationbetweenauditfeeandpreviousyear(s)loss(SimunicA.1980,Basioudis,Francis2007,Choietal.2008, Ireland,Lennox2002).Despitethefactthatsomeofthesestudiesdidnotfindstatisticalsignificance,foundno studies finding negative correlation.As the previous years’ loss can also signalauditee’s financial distress, Niemi (2003a) finds no evidence of financial distressincreasingtheauditfee.
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4.1.2 TheEffectofEarningsManagementAs there is  conflictof interestonallowingearningsmanagementon the financialstatements,priorresearchhasstudiedtheeffectsonthelevelofearningsmanagementallowedonfinancialstatementsduetothenonauditservicesprovidedbytheauditorto.Theopposingviewsarethat,(1)nonauditservicescanstrengthentheeconomicbondwiththeclient,andthusloweringtheindependenceandraisingthepressuretoallow earnings management (Simunic 1984), and (2) The provision of nonauditservices could increase auditor’s reputational capital,decreasing theprobability togiveintothedemandsofanyoneclient(Arruñada2013),ascitedby(Frankel,Johnson
ƬNelson2002).Discussionoverthesimilareffectoftheeconomicrentsassociatedwithauditfeesexistsintheacademicliterature,forexamplebyDeAngelo(1981a)andMageeandTseng(1990).Frankeletal.(2002)findpositiveassociationwithnonauditfees and small earnings surprises, aswell aswith themagnitude of discretionaryaccruals.Thesefindingsarefavoringthefirstview,thattheincreasedeconomicbondalsomeans increasedpressure toallowearningsmanagement.Moreover, they findnegative associationwith theseearningsmanagement indicatorsand theaudit fee,whichisinsupportedbythesimilarfindingsofAbbottetal.(2006).





The value of auditing is partly based on the decreased misstatements and falsereportingoftheaccountinginformationinthefinancialstatements,andthusreducingtheagencycosts(Beckeretal.1998,Watts,Zimmerman1983).Asdiscussedearlier,theacademic literaturehypothesizes that the auditeffort correlateswith the auditquality,which inturn,correlateswiththeearningsquality(Abbott,ParkerƬPeters2006,DeAngelo1981a,Beckeretal.1998,Hay,KnechelƬWong2006).Andearningsqualityisgenerallyconsideredtodecreasewiththeearningsmanagement(McNichols2002,Schipper,Vincent2003,Shivakumar2000).Moreover,auditorsareexpectedtoavoidanycausesforlitigationsandreputationallosses,meaningthatmoreauditeffortisdirectedtodetectandpreventearningsmanipulation,thusresultinginhigherauditfees(Bell,LandsmanƬShackelford2001,Niemi2003b).
























Where CFO represents the cash flow from operations for company i, in period t(Compustatannualdataitem123).Assetsitistotalassetsofcompanyattheendofperiodt-1(Compustatannualdataitem6),Sitisthesalesofcompanyduringperiod
(Compustatannualdataitem12)andσSt=S-St-1Ǥ
Thecoefficientestimatesfromtheequation(6)areusedtoestimatethefirm-specificnormallevelofcashflowfromoperations.TheabnormalcashflowfromoperationsisobtainedbydeductingtheestimatednormalCFOfromtheactualCFO.
Similarly,theproductioncostisevaluatedbyfollowingRoychowdhury(2006),usingthemodeldevelopedbyDechowetal.(1998).Theproductioncostisthesumofcostofgoodssold(Compustatannualdata item41),andchange in inventories(Compustatannualdataitem3).ThenormallevelofproductioncostiscalculatedbycombiningtheCOGSandchangeininventoryduringthefinancialyear.
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=  ߚଵ 1ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ୧୲ିଵ + ߚଶ  ܵܣܮܧ ௜ܵ௧ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜௧ିଵ + ߚଷ  οܵܣܮܧ ௜ܵ௧ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜௧ିଵ + ߚସ οܵܣܮܧ ௜ܵ௧ିଵܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜௧ିଵ + ߝ௜௧ (7)
Where,inadditiontotheestimatednormalCFOmodel’svariables,ȟStit-1/TAit-1istheprevious period’s change in sales. The abnormal production cost component isobtainedbydeductingtheestimatednormalproductioncostfromthereportedcost.
Both estimates ofabnormal components, theCFO andoverproduction, areused asvariables in themainanalysis to evaluate the regressionmodel’s ability to explainvariationintheauditfeevalues.
5.2 ModelandVariablesTheresearchvariablesincludethedependentvariableandtheindependentvariables,which includeboth controlvariablesand the researchvariablesdetecting earningsmanagement.AllthevariablesusedinthisstudyarepresentedinTableʹbelow.
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the audit fee, LogFee. Audit fees arecollected from theWhartonAuditAnalytics database.As discussedpreviously, theauditfeeisexpectedtocorrelatewithauditquality,andthusalsoauditefforts,oftheexternalauditor (Carcello,Nagy2004,Caramanis,Lennox2008,Frankel, JohnsonƬNelson2002,DeAngelo1981b).






sign PriorstudiesLogFee LogarithmofreportedAuditFee  Carcello,Nagyͪ ͨͨͬǢCaramanis,Lennoxͪ ͨͨͰǢFrankel,Johnsonetal.ͪ ͨͨ ǢͪAbbott,Parkeretal.ͪͨ ͨ ǢͮDeAngeloͩ ͱͰͩLogAssets LogarithmofreportedTotalAssets + Hay,Knecheletal.ͪ ͨͨ ǢͮSimunicA.ͩ ͱͰͨǢPong,Witthingtonͩ ͱͱ ǢͬBrinn,Peeletal.ͩ ͱͱͬLogSales LogarithmofreportedSales + Brinn,Peeletal.ͩ ͱͱͬǢPong,Whittingtonͩ ͱͱͬAR/TA ReceivablesscaledbyTotalAssets Ϊ SimunicA.ͩ ͱͰ ͨBig ͬ Binary:ͩ =auditorisoneofthebigfourauditors,otherwiseͨ Ǥ + DeAngeloͩ ͱͰͩa;Palmroseͩ ͱͰ ;ͮFrancis,Wilsonͩ ͱͰͰǢFrankel,Johnsonetal.ͪ ͨͨͪǢCaramanis,Lennoxͪ ͨͨͰǢBrinn,Peeletal.ͩ ͱͱ ͬ
BusyPeriod Binary:ͩ =FYendsinDecember,otherwise .ͨ Ϊ Brinn,Peeletal.ͩ ͱͱͬǢPeel,Robertsͪ ͨͨ ǢͫChan,Ezzameletal.ͩ ͱͱͫ SmallEarnings Binary:ͩ αearnings/totalassetsͨ δδ Ǥͨͨ ǡͩotherwiseͨ . - Leuz,Nandaetal.ͪ ͨͨ ͫLoss Binary:ͩ αreportedlossinpreviousfinancialperiod,otherwiseͨ Ǥ + Kent,Routledgeetal.ͪͨͩ ǢͨFrankel,Johnsonetal.ͪ ͨͨ ǢͪBrinn,Peeletal.ͩ ͱͱ ͬCFO/TA ReportedCFOscaledbyTotalAssets Ϊ Cohen,Deyetal.ͪ ͨͨͰǢGunnyͪ ͨͨ ǢͭRoychowdhuryͪ ͨͨ ǢͮZangͪ ͨͨ ͮabCFO/TA ReportedCFOminustheestimatedCFO,scaledbyTotalAssets Ǧ Cohen,Deyetal.ͪ ͨͨͰǢGunnyͪ ͨͨ ǢͭRoychowdhuryͪ ͨͨ ǢͮZangͪ ͨͨ ͮPROD/TA ReportedproductioncostscaledbyTotalAssets + Cohen,Deyetal.ͪ ͨͨͰǢGunnyͪ ͨͨ ǢͭRoychowdhuryͪ ͨͨ ǢͮZangͪ ͨͨ ͮabPROD/TA Reportedproductioncost(COGSΪchangeininventory)minustheestimatedproductioncost,scaledbyTotalAssets






Asanaverageauditengagementincludesworkonbothauditoftransactions,aswellasverificationofassets,theuseofboth,totalassetsandsales,asmeasureforthesizecanberegardedagreeable(Pong,Whittington1994).Thus,positiveassociationwiththeaudit fee isexpectedofbothofthevariables,LogAssetsandLogSales.Thethirdvariable controls for risk and complexity. In the prior studies, complexity is oftencontrolledbyusingthenumberofforeignsubsidiaries,butchoosetoomititduetothemixedresults frompriorstudies (e.g.Francis,Simon1987,SimunicA.1980,vs.Maheretal.1992,Craswell,Francis1999).Therefore,  choose touse theaccountsreceivables to represent risk and complexity. Thus, the variable is the accountsreceivablesscaledby the totalassets,AR/TA.Thereceivablesratiocontrols for theinherentrisk,aswellas forthecomplexityoftheauditengagement;receivablesaregenerallyregardedasoneofthemoredifficultaccountstoaudit(seee.g.Hay,Knechel
ƬWong2006,Chan,EzzamelƬGwilliam1993,Simunic1984).
Thebigfourauditfirmsareconsideredhigher-qualityauditors,andthus,areexpectedtoacceptlessearningsmanagement,andmorelikelytodetectandreportanyerrorsorirregularities(Beckeretal.1998).Moreover,theauditfirm’ssizeisassociatedwithauditqualityintheacademicliterature,andtherefore,theBig4variableisusedasbinary variable to proxy audit quality (DeAngelo 1981a, Palmrose 1986, Francis,Wilson 1988,DeFond, Jiambalvo1991).Observation receives  value of one if theauditorisoneofthebigfouraudit firms(EY,Deloitte,KPMG,orPWC)andallotherauditorswillbemarkedzero.Inthepriorliteraturethereisdiscussionwhetherthebigauditfirmsarechargingpremiumascompensationfortheso-calledbusyperiodclients(e.g.Francis1984,andChan,EzzamelƬGwilliam1993).Thus,willalsoaddbinaryvariable,BusyPeriod,obtainingthevalueofoneiftheaccountingyearendsinDecember, and otherwise zero. Both the big four and busy period variables areexpectedtohavepositivecoefficients.
Burgstahler and Dichec (1997) find discontinuity in the earnings distribution,suggestingthatcompaniesmakingsmalllossaremanagingearningsupwardstobeatthe zero earningsbenchmark. Prior studies have used  variable composed of netincomeorearningsbeforeextraordinaryitemsscaledbytotalassetstosignalforsmalllossavoidance(Beckeretal.1998,Roychowdhury2006,Leuz,NandaƬWysocki2003).
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Thus,willincludebinaryvariableofsmallearnings(SmallEarnings)asproxyforgeneral earningsmanagement.The variablewillhave  value of one ifnet incomescaledbytotalassetsislessorequalto0.01.Otherwisethevariablewillbezero.Asearningsmanagementisexpectedtodecreasewhenauditqualityincreases,expectthecoefficienttobenegative.
Priorstudieshaveuseddummyvariabletocapturelossinthreeprecedingfinancialreportingperiods(Kent,RoutledgeƬStewart2010).Companiesinfinancialdistressand unprofitable companies are considered riskier andmore challenging to audit(Simunic A. 1980). Moreover, the earnings management literature suggests thatfinancialdistressisdriverforupwardsearningsmanagement(e.g.Dechow,Dichev2002).choosetonarrowdowntherangeoflosstooneyear,inordertocapturelargersample size: observationwill have  value of one in this variable if the precedingfinancial reporting period’s result was negative, otherwise zero. The expectedcoefficientsignispositive.
Inaddition to thepreviouslydiscussedaudit feedeterminants, will include in theregressionmodelthevariablesforthepreviouslyestimatedabnormallevelsofbothcashflowfromoperationsandproductioncost.ThereportedscaledmeasuresofbothCFO and PROD levels are expected to correlatewith firm size, and therefore theexpectedcoefficientsignisalsopositive.WhereastheabnormallevelsofbothCFOandPRODare takenas signalsofearningsmanagement,similarly to thesmallearningsvariable,theyarebothexpectedtobenegative.









5.3 DataThedatawas collected fromCompustat andAuditAnalyticsdatabases inWhartonResearchDataServices.ThesampleconsistsofUSfirms,datacollectedfromtheperiodofsevenyears,between2008and2014.totalof12710firm-yearobservationswerefound,basedon the twodigitSIC codesbetween20and39.Constructing the finalsample, eliminatedthoseobservationsthatdidn’thavealltheneeded information,meaningAuditFee,TotalAssets,AccountsReceivables,IncomeBeforeExtraordinaryItems,CostofGoodsSold,Inventory,Auditor,AuditFee,andFinancialYearend.Aftertheelimination,9541firm-yearsampleswereleft.
Fromthefinalsamplethescaledvariableswerewinsorizedatͳand99percentlevels.
didthattosimplifytheregressionanalysis,asoutliersandskewedsamplesdecreasethe reliabilityof the results. decided towinsorize the tails insteadofdeleting theobservations.Theaimofitwastodiminishthesignificanceofanysingleobservation.




Whereasmorethanthirdoftheobservedfirm-yearsreportedloss(mean0.356).ThereportedCFOrangedbetween-8.2and0.6,0.03beingmean,andfortheproductioncostbetweenzeroand5.7,meanbeing0.73.TheCFOhadstandarddeviationof0.266,thatisquitelow,butthestandarddeviationforthenormallevelofproductioncostwashigh, at 58%.  The abnormal level of the CFO ranged from -8.3 to 0.7 and of theproductioncostbetween-4.6and5.8,andthemeanwaszeroforboth,asshouldbebydefinitionwhenusinganestimationmethodasinthisstudy.ThestandarddeviationsfortheabnormallevelsofCFOandproductioncostare66%and26%,respectively.
Table3.DescriptiveStatistics




Inthischapterwillpresenttheresults.willstartwiththeparameterestimateresultsfor the regression model variables, after which correlation and multicollinearityanalysisarecovered.Aftertheresultsofthemainregressionanalysis,willpresentalsotheresultsoftherobustnesstestusingt-1valuesintheregressionmodel.




Intercept 0.023 ** 0.672 **
-8.455 -96.574
1/TA it-1 -0.011 ** 0.006
(-6.186) -1.494
Sit/TA it-1 0 ** 0.006 **
(-2.936) -14.812
ȴSit/TA it-1 0.118 ** 0.705 **
-12.243 -29.311
ȴS it-1/ TA it- 0.124 **
-12.364
Adjusted R2 0.024 0.143
** Signifi cant a t the 5% level .
This ta ble reports the estimated parameters in the fol l owing regress ions:
CFOit/TA it-1 = ɲ0 + ɲ 1(1/ TA it-1) + ɴ1(St/ TA it-1) + ɴ 2(ȴSit/ TA it-1) + ɸit
PROD it/TA it-1= ɲ 0 + ɲ 1(1/TA it-1) + ɴ 1(Sit/TA it-1) + ɴ 2(ȴSit/TA it-1) + ɴ 3(ȴS  it-1/TA it-1) + ɸit
The va ria bl es a re wi nsori zed a t the top 1% a nd bottom 99% percenti les . The
regres s ions are estimated for manufa cturing indus tri es, defi ned by two digi ts SIC
codes. Table reports the coefficient a nd the t-s tatistics ca lcula ted using s ta ndard
error of the mea n. The table als o reports the R2 for both of the regres s i ons . See
Section 5.1 for  variable description.
CFOit/ TAit-1 PRODit/TA it-1
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The scaled sales variable is negative, contrary to the results obtained byRoychowdhury (2006) and scaled sales change followed Roychowdhury’s (2206)results,whichwascontrarytotheresultsobtainedbyDechowetal.(1998).Regardingtheproductioncostmodel,surprisinglytheinversescalevariablewasnotstatisticallysignificant,andmoreover,itwascontrarytotheresultsbyDechowetal.(1998)andRoychowdhury (2006). In the same vein, the previous year’s change in saleswaspositive,whichiscontrarytotheresultsbyDechowetal.(1998)andRoychowdhury(2006). The rest of the variables were both positive and statistically significant,followingthepriorstudiesresults(Dechowetal.,1998andRoychowdhury,2006).Theadjusted R2 is significantly lower when comparison with the values obtained byRoychowdhury (2006), for theCFOmodel2.4%and for theproduction costmodel14.3%.
6.2 CorrelationAnalysisThe correlation table (Table 5) reports the interdependencies between themodelvariables.Thecorrelationcoefficientsprovidepreliminaryresultsonwhichvariablesare significant regarding the study.Nevertheless, the correlation analysis can onlymeasurecorrelationbetweentwovariablesandstatisticallysignificantcorrelationisnotnecessarily as significant in the actual regression analysis. Still, the correlationanalysis isalso mean toobtainpreliminary resultsonmulticollinearity. (Heikkilä2010pp.91-92)
The correlation table shows that according to the Spearman’s rank correlation thedependent variable, LogFee, has  statistically significant positive correlationwithLogAssets,LogSales,Big4,BusyPeriod,SmallEarnings,CFO/TAandabCFO/TA.ThereisstatisticallysignificantnegativecorrelationbetweenLogFeeandLoss.Thereisstatistically insignificant correlationbetween LogFeeandAR/TA (positive)and theProduction cost variables, PROD/TA and abPROD/TA,which both arenegative. Incomparison to the Pearson correlations, the results look alike, significant positivecorrelation with all except AR/TA, Loss, SmallEarnings and the production costvariables.Thereisnegative,andstatisticallysignificantcorrelationwithLossandalsowith AR/TA, which differs from the Spearman’s correlation. The production cost
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variablesarealsonegative,butunlikeinSpearman’s,inPearson’scorrelationtheyarestatistically significant, leaving only the SmallEarnings variable insignificant.  AlsonotableisthattheabnormalCFOispositivelycorrelated,andstatisticallysignificant,totheproductioncostvariables,eventhoughpriorstudiessuggestthattheseshouldbenegativelycorrelatedasoverproductiontendstoleadtoabnormallylowCFO,andviceversa,salesmanipulationresultingtohighsalestendtoraisetheproductioncosts(Roychowdhury2006)














6.3 MulticollinearityForthesakeofreliabilityoftheregressionanalysis,itisimportantthatthecollinearitybetween the researchvariables isnot too strong..That is, thevariables shouldnotcorrelatewitheachothertoomuch.Thesocalledmulticollinearityaffectsthevariablesthat have collinearity to have too much importance in the regression analysis.Multicollinearity can be detected by examining the tolerance or the VIF value.Tolerance is  value that implies howmuch of the dependent variable’s change isexplainedbyothervariables:thelowerthevalue,thehigherthedependenceforthevariableunderscrutiny.TheVIFvalueistheinverseoftolerance,thus,thehighertheVIFthemoreprobableitisthatmulticollinearitywillskewtheresultsoftheregressionanalysis.Ingeneral,VIFisnotallowedtotopthelimitvalueof10.Theprimaryconcernisthattheregressionresultsandthestandarderrorsforthecoefficientscanbecomenotablymagnified.ThecollinearitystatisticsforallthevariablesarepresentedinthefollowingTable6.
 





Althoughinthisstudytherearevariablesthatexceedthelimitvalue,thevariablesthatdo so, the logarithm of assets and of sales, are actually expected to correlate, andmoreover,astheyaremerelycontrolvariables,themulticollinearityconcernscanbediscardedonthesevariables.DuetothehighcollinearityoftheCFOandProductioncostvariables,theregressionmodelisruninfourstages,toexplicitlyshowtheeffectofthemulticollinearityonthecoefficientsandsignificance.
6.4 RegressionAnalysisRegression analysis is used to examine the several independent variables’simultaneouseffectonthedependentvariable.Theregressionanalysisisdividedintofourparts.First,theregressionanalysisiscarriedoutusingthetraditionalvariablesusedtoexplaintheauditfee,asdiscussedpreviouslyinChapter5.2,inordertohavecontrol results (Model1).Afterwhich, theactual regressionanalysis is carriedoutincludingthechosenvariablestofurtherexplainthedeterminationoftheauditfeeandillustrating the effect of earningsmanagement on audit fee (Model 2). The thirdregression(Model3) includesallthevariables,andthuspresentsalsothevariableswiththemulticollinearityproblem,theCFOandproductioncostvariables.Onthelaststage,theregressionisrunwithouttheestimatesofabnormalCFOandproductioncost(model4).TheresultsoftheregressionanalysisarepresentedintheTable7.
6.4.1 TheControlVariableModelThefirstmodelincludesthecontrolvariablescommonlyusedintheexistingresearchofauditfeesinordertoprovidegroundforcomparisonfortheearningsmanagementmodel results. In order to better understand themutual effects, the standardizedcoefficients are presented. On the firstmodel, as presented on the table, the sizemeasurevariable,LogAssetsitisbothpositiveandstatisticallysignificant,0.756,andoutofallthecontrolvariables,hasthestrongesteffectonauditfee.Alsothevariablepresentingriskinessofthefirm,AR/TA,aswellasthedummyvariablesforBig4andLosshavepositiveandstatisticallysignificanteffectonauditfee,althoughtheeffectisnotasstrongaswithassets(0.031,0.021and0.074respectively).Although,inpriorstudiesiftheauditishappeninginthebusyperiod,thatis,ifthefinancialyearendsinDecember,ithashadpositiveandsignificanteffectontheauditfee,inmyregression
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anddata this isnot implicit; the coefficient ispositive (0.010)but statisticallynotsignificant.Neither istheothersizeproxy,LogSales,althoughpositivecoefficientof0.033.
Theexplanatorypowerofthemodel,thevalue,growsasnewvariablesareadded,thus it ismore informative touse theadjustedR.Theadjustedgrowsonly if theexplanatorypowertrulygrows,regardlessofthenumberofthevariables.Theadjusted
forthemodelis0.576,thus,thecontrolvariablesexplain57.6percentofthechangesintheauditfee.Thiscanberegardedasfairlygoodexplanatorypower.Basedonthesefindings,thecontrolvariablesseemtoworkasexpectedanditisjustifiedtousethemontheauditfeeregressionmodel.

6.4.1 TheResearchVariableModelsThesecondmodelisusedtodeterminetheeffectthattheresearchvariableshaveonthe audit fee.  Themodels through two to four are used to evaluate the researchhypothesis,andthefindingsarecomparedwithpriorstudies.









LogAssetsit = Log of Assets of company i in year i. ARit/TAit = Receivables scaled by total assets of company i in year t . Big4 = one if the audit isperformed by one of the Big Four Audit firms (Deloitte, EY, KPMG, PWC); otherwise zero. BusyPeriod = one if the financial year ended inDecember, otherwise zero. SmallEarningsit = one if the Net Income of company i in year t was less than 1% of the total assets; otherwise zero.Lossit = one if the Net Income was negative; otherwise zero. PROD/ TA it-1= Production Cost of company i in year t scaled by Total Assets ofcompany i in year t-1 . abPROD/TA it-1 = the abnormal component of actual Production Cost of company i in year t , calculated by subtractingthe estimated PROD from the actual. CFO/TAit-1= Cash Flow from Operations of company i in year t scaled by Total Assets of company i inyear t-1 . abCFO/TA it-1 = the abnormal component of actual Cash Flow from Operations of company i in year t , calculated by subtracting theestimatedCFOfromtheactual.
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Onthethirdmodel,addedthescaledreportedproductioncostandCFO.Theadditionhad little effect on the control variables in comparison to the previous model.Nevertheless, the variable for the abnormal component of CFO lost its statisticalsignificance,and resulted inan incline in thecoefficientof theabPROD/TA, -0.039.From thenewvariables,only reportedproduction costwas statistically significant,withpositivecoefficientof0.068,whereasCFOwas0.089.interprettheseasresultofmulticollinearity,andinordertosupportit,ranthefourthmodel,wheredidnotincludetheabnormalvariables,butinsteadonlythescaledreportedPRODandCFO.This change did not affect the control variables compared to the coefficients andsignificanceofthemodelthreeatall.Moreover,thebothPROD/TAandCFO/TAwerestatisticallysignificantandpositive,0.071and0.033respectively,whichinterprettosupportthemulticollinearityspeculation.TheadjustedR2grewfromthefirstmodelby0.3percentagepoints,theexplanatorypowertotalingto57.9percentinthesecondmodel,andto58.0percentinthethirdandfourthmodels.Thisisevidencethattheearningsmanagementmodelsdoexplaintheauditfeevariationbetterthanthemoretraditionalvariableofthecontrolmodel(model1).

6.4.2 SensitivityAnalysis
performedsensitivityanalysisontheauditfeeusingthesameregressionmodelasinthemainanalysis,butusedtheprioryearobservationsfortheindependentvariablesandestimatedtheCFOandProductioncostforthepreviousyearthroughwhichtheabnormal levels of CFO and Production costswere computed. The results for theregressionanalysisarepresentedinTable8.








Coeff. t-stat sig.LogAssetsit-1 .682 37.851 .000LogSalesit-1 .125 6.760 .000AR/TAt-1 -.019 -2.940 .003Big4 .018 2.927 .003BusyPeriod .019 3.229 .001Losst-2 .054 7.586 .000SmallEarningst-2 -.006 -1.008 .009abCFOt-1 -.002 -.259 .439abPRODt-1 -.004 -.685 .042
Intercept 180.752 .000YearDummies YesAdjustedR .608N ͻ541
LogAuditFeesensitivityanalysis
LogAssetsit = Log of Assets of company i in year t-1 . AR/TA = Receivables scaledby total assets of company i in year t . Big4 = one if the audit is performed by oneof the Big Four Audit firms (Deloitte, EY, KPMG, PWC); otherwise zero. BusyPeriod= one if the financial year ended in December, otherwise zero. SmallEarnings t-1αone if the Net Income of company i in year t-1 was less than 1% of the totalassets; otherwise zero. LogSalesit = Log of Sales of company i in year t-1 . Lossit-1αone if Net Income of the company i in year t-1 was negative. abCFOTA it-1 = theabnormalcomponentofactualCashFlowfromOperationsofcompanyi inyear







Inthisstudy,performedregressionanalysisonauditfeeswithdependentvariablescontrollingforsize(LogAssetsandLogSales),riskiness(AR/TA),auditquality(Big4),as well as for the busy period and loss, and variables controlling for earningsmanagement, in general (SmallEarnings), and specifically for real earningsmanagement (the estimated abnormal levels of cash flow from operations andproductioncost:abCFOandabPROD).
MyadjustedRʹforthecontrolmodelandfortheearningsmanagementmodelsweresomewhatlowincomparisonwithpriorstudies.Itmightbethatthetraditionalauditfeemodelmaynotbesowellspecifiedtoearningsmanagement,oritmightbeduetoomittedvariables.Nevertheless,priorstudieshavefoundtheauditeesizetoexplainmostofthevariationinauditfees(Simunic1984,Francis1984),andthisisthecasealsoinmystudy.Similarly,myresultsfollowSimunic’s(1980)findingsregardingtheriskvariable,(AR/TA)thatisstatisticallysignificantandpositivecoefficient.Also,aspriorstudieshave found the ‘big four’(orbig five,sixoreight)audit firms tohavehigherfees,althoughthefindingsarenotuniform,myresultssuggestthatthebigauditfirmsdohavepositiveassociationwithhigherauditfees(Brinn,PeelƬRoberts1994,Frankel,JohnsonƬNelson2002,Niemi2003b).
Inpriorstudiesperforminganauditduring thebusyperiodhashad positiveandsignificanteffectontheaudit fee, inmyregressionanddatathis isnot implicit;thecoefficient ispositive (0.008)but statisticallynot significant.Thereare alsomixedresultsinpriorstudiesregardingthis(Brinn,PeelƬRoberts1994).Inmystudy,thismightbeduetothefactthatfromtheobservedfirmslargenumberisauditedduring
busyperiod(ascanbeseenfromthedescriptivestatistics,over70%),thusdilutingtheeffectofnon-busyperiod“discount”fee.Lossvariablewasstatisticallysignificantwithpositivecoefficient,asexpectedbasedonthereviewedliterature.




Therobustnesstestisexplainingtheresultsfromtheprimarymodelevenbetter.Astheauditfeemightbenegotiatedtolargeextendalreadyinthebeginningoftheyear,thet-1variablescanbeexpectedtobetterexplaintheearningsmanagementeffects.And so the results do: The loss variable is positive and statistically significant asexpected,andinlinewiththepriorstudies;lossinthepreviousyearmightindicatefinancial distress, and therefore the firm should be audited more carefully, thusresulting in higher audit fee. Small earnings coefficient ispositive, although onlymarginally,butmoreinterestinglynowstatisticallysignificant.Thus,itisinfavoroftheassumptionofauditqualitycorrelatingwithauditfee.Theestimationvariablesfortheabnormal levels ofCFO andPROD arebothnegative,but only theproduction costvariableisstatisticallysignificant.Astherearenopriorstudiesregardingtheeffectsofrealearningsmanagementonauditfees,havenoexplanationforthisbehavior.canonlyassumethattherealoperationmanipulationmightbemoredifficulttodetectingeneral,andmaybeoverproductiontodecreaseproductioncostiseasiertoidentifytoearningsmanagementincomparisontosalesmanipulationpractices.





This study has two kinds of implications. First, the academic contribution to theliteratureoftheauditfeedeterminant,bydemonstratingtheassociationofearningsmanagement and audit fee. In addition, this study focuses on the real earningsmanagement, rather than the accruals-based earnings management. Earningsmanagementliteraturehastraditionallyfocusedonaccrualsmanipulation,butrecentresearchfindings indicatethatrealearningsmanipulationmighthavebecomemorecommon in today’sbusiness environment (e.g. Li et al.2011; Graham et al.2005;Roychowdhury2006), and therefore, this study is contributing to the literaturebybridgingthegapbetweentheacademicliteratureandbusinesspractice.
Theresultsindicatethatearningsmanagementisinverselyassociatedwithauditfee,and thus suggesting that higherquality auditors are less inclined to allow it. Thatmeansthatcompaniesareableaffectthedegreeofearningsmanagementpossibilities,bychoosingthelevelofauditqualitythroughchoosingtheirauditor.Bychoosinghighqualityauditor,e.g.oneofthebigfour,firmisnarrowingdownthepossibilitiesofengaginginearningsmanagement.
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